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This paper provides an overview of the link between policy and economic growth. It stresses that 
while growth, as measured and discussed, is a macroeconomic phenomenon, the best available 
evidence of policy effectiveness is typically from studies using micro data. It also reiterates the 
message that divergence between private and social returns is a key part of the evidence needed to 
discuss what kinds of policy intervention are desirable. 
JEL classification: D90, H30. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The link between public policies and aggregate economic performance, 
measured by growth rates in or levels of income per capita, has a central place in 
economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to offer a brief bird’s-eye view of the 
issues and evidence. The focus is on reviewing the knowledge base on which we 
can draw in making claims about policy effectiveness and desirability. 
The organising question that I will take for the paper is ‘what can we say 
about the optimal way for government to intervene in the economy when the 
objective is to promote national output?’. This is essentially a macroeconomic 
question. However, I will argue that, in understanding the answer to this, it is 
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essential to draw on the increasing body of evidence of the effects of government 
policies on behaviour at the micro level. This comprises studies of the 
households and firms that are the key economic actors at the heart of the 
economy. By and large, the empirical evidence derived at a macro level is too 
crude and fraught with difficulties of interpretation to be useful in specific policy 
analyses. 
The case for government intervention comes down to two main things: 
•  the behavioural response of the economic actors who are affected by policy; 
and 
•  the divergence between private and social returns to the activities that they 
produce. 
The latter must rest on identifying the market failure that policy is trying to fix, 
with the policy solution being tailored to deal with the problem. Below, I will 
discuss sources of estimates on social returns and their reliability. I will then 
discuss policies that promote capital accumulation (either by increasing the 
supply of savings or by encouraging investment), provision of key public goods, 
fostering human capital accumulation and encouraging innovation. 
When assessing aggregate economic performance, it is important at the outset 
to distinguish between level and growth effects from government policy. A focus 
on growth suggests that we are interested in policies that increase the rate of 
change of national income. While the theory is often precise about which kind of 
effect we are focusing on, the empirical analysis tends to be much less clear. At 
some level, it may not matter too much. A policy with a level effect on national 
income that disappears in the long run after a period of adjustment will certainly 
be hard to distinguish empirically from a policy with a permanent growth effect 
in the kind of data that we have. It is equally unclear whether we would care very 
much in practice which kind of effect was at work. On the other hand, cost–
benefit calculations of interventions may be highly sensitive to this. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I will 
discuss the welfare economics of growth. Section III does a basic growth 
accounting exercise. Section IV looks at the evidence on the main components of 
growth. Section V considers issues surrounding imperfect competition and 
intermediate goods taxation. Section VI offers a few concluding remarks. 
II. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH 
Policy-makers care about aggregate performance. However, it is also clear that 
aggregate indicators are only part of a complex set of multiple objectives that 
policy pursues. Moreover, it is obvious that there may be conflicts between 
them. The possibilities that growth promotion comes at the expense of economic 
equality or environmental protection are two key concerns that are frequently Public Policies and Aggregate Economic Performance 
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voiced by those who suggest that too much attention is paid to the performance 
of the aggregate economy as a measure of societal well-being.  
For the purposes of the discussion in this paper, I will take it as read that the 
main objective of policy is aggregate output. Once we know the policy links to 
achieve this, then we can go back and reassess the possibility of conflict with 
other objectives.  
The theory of optimal economic growth began around 75 years ago with 
Ramsey’s path-breaking analysis, supposedly based on dinner-time discussions 
with Keynes. The focus of that literature is on the optimal rate of saving out of 
national income to maximise some long-run discounted pay-off. The literature 
concerns itself principally with the optimal time path for capital accumulation — 
ignoring the roles of human capital and innovation which have been so 
prominent in recent theories of growth. The basic conclusion of these models is 
that the ‘correct’ rate of accumulation should balance the rate of time preference 
in society with the rate of return to capital. This is really an issue of 
intergenerational justice, resolved in the modelling exercise by positing an 
infinitely lived individual who represents a dynasty. The rate of accumulation 
within a society and its consequent path of progress affect the well-being of 
generations as yet unborn.  
A key issue is whether we should expect that a market economy in which 
capital accumulation decisions are left to markets would accumulate in the way 
that the theory of optimal growth suggests that it should. As demonstrated by 
Diamond (1965) among others, there is scant reason to be optimistic in this 
regard. If generations who are currently alive fail to value the consumption of 
future generations, then they underaccumulate relative to the path chosen by a 
dynasty.
1 If a view is taken about the ‘correct’ way to value these generations, 
then a judgement can be formed on the optimal time path. The most clear-cut 
theoretical problem focused on in the literature is actually that of 
overaccumulation. It is possible that the rate of saving (and investment) is so 
high that, by reducing accumulation, all generations (current and future) will be 
better off. (The future generations benefit from ‘inheriting’ a higher marginal 
return to capital formation.) Abel et al. (1989) devise an ingenious test for 
whether this is true of the main OECD economies and conclude that it is not. I 
am not aware of any study that has updated their analysis to a more recent 
period. However, equally, there are no particular reasons to think that things are 
very different today. 
Many of the policy concerns among OECD economies suggest a fear about 
underaccumulation. To rationalise this, it is common to select a particular growth 
path from among those that are dynamically efficient and compare the current 
rate of accumulation with it. A frequently used benchmark is the golden rule — 
loosely, the rate of accumulation that maximises the rate of consumption per 
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capita. On that criterion, some have argued that there is a case for incentives to 
promote accumulation (particularly in the USA). However, before embracing 
this kind of finding, it should be clear that this embodies a particular judgement 
about the right distribution of consumption between generations. In effect, the 
implicit view is that the current generation is consuming too much and that it 
should be persuaded to leave more resources for the future by subsidising 
investment.  
A more robust set of policy proposals can be approached by considering the 
possibility that there are important accumulation decisions that contribute to 
aggregate economic performance where the marginal private return is below the 
marginal social return leading to underaccumulation. This would generate the 
possibility of a classic market failure — in which the well-being of present and 
future generations can be raised by appropriate government intervention. 
On this score, few would doubt the theoretical validity of the case for 
promoting infrastructure investments with large public goods components, where 
non-excludability of benefits leads to underprovision by the market. This 
promotion may take the form of direct government construction, subsidising 
private alternatives or simply promoting a legal environment that creates viable 
property rights for potential entrepreneurs.  
Recent advances in growth theory have made much of two other cases where 
the prima facie case for private returns being below social returns is strong. The 
first of these is accumulation of human capital, where it is posited that standard 
private rates of return to human capital ignore a social component that makes 
everyone else in society more productive. This is in addition to concerns that 
other market failures — for example, in credit markets — lead to 
underinvestment and failure to reap the private returns by some groups. The 
other case is the process of innovation — broadly defined. In spite of the 
elaborate legal protection of intellectual property, there are good reasons to 
suppose that innovators fail to capture the full social returns to what they 
produce. This again suggests a possible role for government in promoting such 
activities. 
Before proceeding to the evidence, it is useful to review a simple ‘rule’ for 
optimality of government spending to promote aggregate output. This will serve 
as organising principle for our discussion of what we know about the 
effectiveness of policy to affect this objective. A similar rule could be restated 
for a growth objective. However, virtually all of the evidence that we have for 
divergence between private and social returns to accumulation is about effects on 
levels of aggregate output, not on growth rates. Hence, from a practical point of 
view, the distinction is not particularly important.  
Spending government resources to promote output has costs and benefits. The 
cost is simply the opportunity cost of the revenues used. From this point of view, 
it is well known that, when tax revenue is scarce, it is better to have higher taxes 
on goods that are demanded/supplied inelastically — the so-called inverse Public Policies and Aggregate Economic Performance 
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elasticity rule. This basic result holds, regardless of the social objective being 
pursued. The benefit comes from using the tax revenue to promote an activity 
that is favourable to the objective being pursued. Here, we are interested in the 
divergence between private and social returns to accumulation. The case for 
offering a favourable tax treatment — even a subsidy — will rest on that 
divergence being significant. 
There is a simple formula that relates these costs and benefits. It is simply the 
product of saying that government should pursue its objective by setting the 
marginal cost and benefit equal. In the current context, this says 
Marginal social value of increasing   by one unit




= Marginal cost to government of increasing activity   by one unit x , 
where η is a parameter that reflects the policy sensitivity of x. A high value of η 
is a case where it is difficult to affect x by policy and a low value a case where it 
is easy. Intuitively, if it is easy to affect the outcome of interest (η low), then the 
cost of the incentive will be greater as there will be more activity of this kind to 
subsidise. 
In theory, this type of equation is useful for two things. First, it gives an 
absolute sense of the optimal government policy for a given marginal cost of 
public funds. Second, it can give a sense of the relative incentives used across an 
array of policies that contribute towards a particular social objective.  
This formula is useful as an aide-memoir for thinking about the link between 
the incentives that we might want to put in place to promote aggregate economic 
performance. In that case, the xs are the inputs into aggregate production — see 
below. Their marginal social values are their social returns. The η is derived 
from studies of how effectively government can affect these aggregates via 
policy. For taxes and subsidies, the marginal cost term can be thought of as being 
roughly proportional to the size of the aggregate being affected. The formula 
suggests that it is the interplay between these factors that determines the case for 
government intervention. 
For the remainder of the paper, we will consider how the existing state of 
empirical knowledge enables us to put some orders of magnitude to the different 
components in this formula. 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR GROWTH 
It is useful to begin with some basic growth accounting. Suppose that we 
consider a production function for national income: 
(, , ,) YF L K H A = , Fiscal Studies 
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where Y is income, L is labour input, K is capital input, H is human capital input 
and A is technology. Then growth can be decomposed in the following way: 
  YK KL L H HA A ggggg αα αα =+ ++ , 
where gi is a growth rate and αi is the share of factor i in national income. In 
practice, this way of thinking about the issues is misleading — we cannot 
measure the contributions of H and A to output separately from their raw 
components K and L. However, the message is clear — that for public policy to 
have an impact on growth, it has to have some impact on one or more 
components of growth. Hence, schematically, it is useful to think about the role 
of government by thinking of the ways in which it could potentially change these 
components.  
This is pure accountancy — there is no underlying theory about the sources 
of accumulation. The most influential neo-classical theory was developed by 
Solow and Swan, emphasising the importance of capital accumulation to a 
steady state set by exogenous technological change. More recent thinking has 
been dominated by a variety of approaches collected under the heading of 
endogenous growth theory, where greater weight is attached to the process of 
innovation and to human capital as engines of growth. This is certainly not the 
place to review these contributions.
2 Endogenous growth has proved somewhat 
liberating for the study of policy and other influences of growth — the 
traditional model suggested that we could identify sources of level effects on 
national income but that this would not necessarily lead to changes in the long-
run rate of change of income per capita. In terms of the above accounting 
equation, endogenous growth theory is also a way of accounting for the growth 
residual that one finds after accounting for changes in capital and labour input.
3 
In taking growth theory to the data, one is left with the difficulty that only 
physical capital and raw labour input data are typically available for a large 
number of countries on a consistent basis. Even then, the quality of the data 
varies enormously by country and over time. Hence one is normally left with the 
task of explaining a residual (total factor productivity) — that part of the change 
in income per capita that is not explained by increases in K and L.  
A large literature has developed in recent years that examines policy 
effectiveness using cross-country evidence.
4 Typically, this involves running a 
regression (normally a cross-section regression, but sometimes using panel data) 
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with a particular set of policy variables as regressors. As a guide to policy, the 
literature is rather inconclusive. First, the comparison of policies across 
countries is extremely difficult. The authors are often reduced to using some 
kind of crude measure, such as the share of government in national income, as a 
measure of government policy. Not surprisingly, therefore, studies often yield 
contradictory and unrobust findings. Second, the sources of policy influence and 
their link to changes in underlying behaviour are impossible to assess in broad-
brush growth regressions. Third, it is near impossible to assess the directions of 
causation in this framework. 
A better guide for policy is needed. Staying within a macroeconomic 
structure, there are a number of studies that have attempted to calibrate growth 
models to the data and used this as a basis for performing policy experiments. 
Stokey and Rebello’s (1995) paper is a good example of a quality analysis of this 
form. They investigate whether moving towards a flat tax, as proposed by a 
number of policy-makers in the USA, would lead to more growth. Their 
framework is an endogenous growth model with human capital. They pinpoint 
the key parameters that affect the growth consequences of tax reform. They show 
these to be the tax sensitivity of labour supply decisions and the rate of 
intertemporal substitution which affects consumers’ willingness to substitute 
future for present consumption. When there is little responsiveness on this front 
— as the micro evidence suggests that there should be — then there are modest 
overall effects of tax reform on growth. I am not aware of studies of this kind for 
the UK. They are clearly an important addition to the policy debate.  
IV. COMPONENTS OF GROWTH 
The biggest growth area in public economics in the last 20 years has been our 
increased capacity to assess the impact of policy on the behaviour of households, 
firms and governments at a microeconomic level, studying the effect of 
incentives on outcomes. Economic theory gives a rather rich characterisation of 
the possible sources of impact of government on behaviour. However, there is 
now a consensus that this is of limited value unless it is accompanied by 
measurement of the requisite effects.  
The two margins that have been most widely studied in the context of 
households are labour supply and saving. Here, the key issue is how far taxes on 
labour and capital income affect decisions about these. Some significant 
attention has also been paid to accumulation of human capital, and how 
government policy towards education shapes individuals’ decisions to attend 
school and university. In the case of firms, investment decisions and financial 
policy are among the most studied.  
The greatest limits on such studies are access to data to study behavioural 
outcomes and finding a source of policy variation. Unless there is either cross-
sectional or time-series variation in policy outcomes, there is little hope of Fiscal Studies 
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identifying a policy effect. Even then, there are all sorts of concerns that 
economists have worried about endlessly.  
While the studies are often on micro data, the implications for the 
macroeconomy are profound. However, there are issues from moving to what are 
often case studies on particular kinds of households or firms to a larger picture. 
The literature on the study of policy impacts is too vast to attempt anything 
close to a survey here. Instead, let me focus a little on two of the key elasticities 
that come out of the growth literature that tries to calibrate theory to the data. As 
we discussed above, Stokey and Rebello (1995) find that assumptions on labour 
supply elasticities and intertemporal substitution elasticities are key contentious 
parameters.  
1. Physical Capital 
Growth accounting exercises and regression analysis all point to the centrality of 
capital accumulation in explaining economic performance. There are three 
important public policy angles on this: (i) factors that affect the supply of 
savings — through providing public substitutes for private savings through 
social security programmes or taxation of capital income; (ii) factors that affect 
incentives of firms to invest in different assets; and (iii) complementarity and 
substitutability between public and private capital. I will discuss each of these in 
turn and the main lessons that we have learned. 
Saving 
There is a huge literature on the ability of the state to affect the supply of private 
savings. A key issue is whether taking a perspective of any particular economy is 
sensible in this context. To the extent that world capital markets are integrated, it 
is arguable that investors should be able to secure capital in a world market. 
Moreover, international capital mobility should limit the ability of states to tax 
the return to saving effectively.  
While the open economy perspective is important, the literature is still highly 
influenced by the paper by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), which found that 
saving and investment rates within countries are highly correlated, making the 
supply of domestic capital through savings a key issue of concern. Moreover, 
many different countries of the world have enacted policies that are intended to 
stimulate private accumulation — which suggests that they are concerned about 
the level of savings.  
The debate about saving is highly influenced by the perspective in the USA, 
where influential economists have long been concerned about the low level of 
private saving. Moreover, the discussion has a paradoxical air, since one of the 
main reasons for concern is public policy towards old-age retirement, whence it 
is argued that social security financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis has 
undermined saving incentives. Thus, one kind of policy (improved saving Public Policies and Aggregate Economic Performance 
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incentives) is needed to correct for another kind of policy (PAYG social 
security). Of course, the issues are often political — looking for a solution that 
will deliver gains to working and non-working generations alike.  
In the wake of policy experiments aimed at increasing savings, there have 
been opportunities to test how responsive consumers are to changes in the 
returns to saving.
5 In standard theory of the consumer, there is a close link 
between this responsiveness and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (a 
key parameter in the macro-growth literature discussed above). Efforts at 
measuring this elasticity in a variety of ways have not yielded much evidence of 
responsiveness (although responses, such as they are, appear to be greater at 
lower income levels). The new literature on taxation and saving has exploited 
evidence on responses to newly created incentives — mainly in the USA but also 
in the UK. The typical scenario is to look at how consumers respond to the 
government creating a tax-favoured form of saving, such as Tax-Exempt Special 
Savings Accounts (TESSAs) in the UK. The jury is still out. However, two 
things come clearly out of the literature. First, there is strong evidence that 
savers find tax-efficient forms of saving. However, there is little evidence of 
strong aggregate saving effects from the kinds of government-sponsored saving 
initiatives that we see. 
The focus on taxation and saving is somewhat narrow. In recent work, 
Bernheim and his co-authors have been looking at the response of saving 
behaviour to education programmes.
6 It is even possible that the effect of 
government programmes may be the education component rather than the tax 
component. In the end, it is not obvious how much we should worry about these 
results from the microeconomic literature on saving. There is no particularly 




The literature on public policy and investment has three main aspects — effects 
on overall investment levels, effects on the type of assets in which firms invest 
and on the way in which investment is financed, and a firm’s financial policy 
more generally.  
Theoretical models of investment focus on the effect of government policy on 
investment through changes in the user cost of capital. First-generation studies 
using time-series macro evidence did not suggest that the user cost was an 
important determinant of investment. More recent cross-country evidence and 
studies of firm-level data suggest a greater significance for the user cost in 
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explaining investment levels. Hassett and Hubbard (1996) review the evidence 
and suggest a consensus estimate of the elasticity of investment with respect to 
changes in user cost of –0.5 to –1.00. This is similar to the range for research and 
development (R&D) expenditures recently estimated by Bloom, Griffith and Van 
Reenen (2001). Mapping these estimates into policy experiments is not 
straightforward, given the complexity of the user cost and the way that it 
depends on taxes, depreciation allowances, etc. However, it is no longer tenable, 
as it was sometimes argued historically, that prices do not matter when 
investment is at issue. 
The magnitude of the behavioural response is only part of the story. The key 
issue is whether the social and private returns diverge creating an argument for 
subsidising some particular types of investment. Based on the elasticity estimates 
above, it is not clear that there would be much of a case for treating R&D and 
other forms of investment differently on revenue-raising grounds as they have 
similar elasticities. 
In terms of private and social return, some economists (for example, Hassett 
and Hubbard (1996)) argue that there is a case for believing that there is 
underaccumulation of physical capital in general and that the government should 
stimulate investment through tax incentives. As I pointed out above, this is really 
an argument about intergenerational justice rather than about economic 
efficiency. However, this could, in principle, provide the basis for believing in 
the need to promote investment in general.
8 
There is a literature that has argued that the optimal rate of capital income 
taxation is zero.
9 This is a bit like a dynamic version of the Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971) efficiency theorem saying that there should be no intermediate 
goods taxation. While capital may be inelastically supplied in the short run and 
hence be a good source of tax revenue, its supply in the long run is highly 
elastic.
10 The latter effect can be shown to dominate in an economy with 
consumers with long time horizons. The result does, however, turn out to be 
quite special, holding only under very restrictive assumptions (see Aiyagari 
(1995)). Hence, it is not clear that the practical force of these models is 
particularly great. However, we will return to the general theme of production 
efficiency and intermediate goods taxation below. 
More convincing is the possibility that there are divergences between private 
and social returns due to externalities in particular kinds of investment leading 
to a case for more favourable tax treatment. DeLong and Summers (1991) argue 
that there are significant externalities from investments in equipment as opposed 
to other kinds of fixed capital. They estimate a social return in the region of 20 
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per cent from a cross-section of 61 countries. However, their results are not 
without controversy, as they themselves note.
11 In the end, as acknowledged by 
DeLong and Summers, the quality of the cross-country data makes the kind of 
exercise that they perform fraught with difficulty. This is a general difficulty 
using cross-country data to evaluate investment returns, given the quality of the 
data and the difficulties of establishing causality. 
Perhaps the most influential arguments for divergence between social and 
private returns come from investment in R&D. There is a large literature that has 
tried to argue for a divergence between the private and social returns to 
innovation. A useful survey is found in Jones and Williams (1998). Typical 
social rates of return to R&D investment are of the order of 25–30 per cent, 
compared with private returns in the 7–14 per cent range. If correct, this would 
suggest the possibility of substantial underinvestment in R&D by market 
economies and significant scope for encouragement by the state.  
In this regard, the types of policy that governments can use to promote R&D 
effectively are important. One possibility is science policy. However, there are 
other, more traditional, instruments, such as tax credits, that can play an 
important role. Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2001) find that such 
investment does appear to be responsive to changes in user costs, suggesting that 
government policy can be effective in promoting such investments.  
Infrastructure 
A central role of government is to ensure that there are adequate levels of 
infrastructure needed to support economic activity. This ranges from institutions 
for the enforcement of contracts and property rights through to construction of 
roads and bridges. Aggregate models of economic performance (such as Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992)) have explored some of the theoretical relationships 
and the possible reasons for divergences between private and social returns. 
However, the empirical evidence on this divergence is quite limited. 
Estimates of the social rate of return to infrastructure projects are surprisingly 
few. Moreover, they tend to be in the form of aggregates such as ‘total 
infrastructural investment’ rather than its components. Aschauer (1989) presents 
some of the earliest estimates of public spending on aggregate performance and 
finds large effects. More recent work has reassessed this. For example, Holtz-
Eakin and Schwartz (1995) look at evidence from across the USA and find 
modest productivity effects from infrastructure investments — around 1–2 per 
cent returns.  
In the post-war period, a great deal of infrastructural investment was 
undertaken by the state in the UK. However, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
and other initiatives are shifting the balance. Moreover, telecommunications, a 
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vital part of infrastructure, is now largely privatised. This raises a further issue of 
complementarity and substitutability of private and public spending, which has 
not been considered in the empirical literature in this area.
12 
This is a key area in which knowledge is weakest and there is scope for much 
further research. I am not aware of any convincing micro-level studies of the 
effect of infrastructure investment on productivity. 
2. Labour Input 
The basic macro models suggested that there are two main channels via which 
labour and growth interact — either by the supply of raw labour input or by 
quality improvements — particularly investment in human capital. There is also 
the possibility that there are benefits from labour organisation — more flexible 
labour practices leading to increased innovation and greater growth.  
Labour Supply 
The labour supply has recently been comprehensively reviewed by Blundell and 
McCurdy (2000). It is useful to distinguish between incentives on the extensive 
margin (participation in the labour force) and on the intensive margin (effort or 
hours worked). The evidence suggests that responsiveness to taxes and income 
transfers is mainly on the former and that the latter is relatively inelastic. This is 
key as the results from Stokey and Rebello (1995) suggest that the growth effects 
from tax cuts on earnings will be modest when this is the case.  
It is clear that there are significant one-off efficiency gains to be made by 
increasing the application of labour input. It is also reasonable to argue that the 
social returns to getting certain groups back into the labour force exceed the 
private benefits. Thus studies of the effect on income transfer programmes and 
tax changes on the extensive margin are of social consequence. However, there 
is no good reason to believe that there are strong interactions with growth from 
raw labour input effects.  
Feldstein (1995) suggests that income declared to tax authorities is much 
more responsive to taxation than evidence on labour supply responses would 
suggest. This could be interpreted as suggesting that there is a wider disincentive 
effect of taxation than through hours of work adjustment — perhaps reductions 
in effort intensity or ambition for promotion. Alternatively, it could suggest that, 
in striving for greater tax efficiency in their affairs, individuals seek more 
effective tax avoidance measures at higher tax rates. The distinction is important, 
as only the former is important from the point of view of aggregate output — the 
latter being essentially a transfer. The jury is still out on the best way to interpret 
the data. 
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Human Capital 
Human capital policy is an important focus for the link between public policy 
and growth. Many endogenous growth models (such as Lucas (1988)) place 
human capital formation at centre stage in exploring the reasons for long-run 
growth. However, as we argued above, the case for subsidising human capital on 
a wide scale rests on there being important divergences between private and 
social returns. Otherwise, government provision would merely be crowding out 
private provision by far-sighted optimising individuals.  
Governments have a large array of tools aimed at promoting the accumulation 
of human capital. There is a large literature that attempts to estimate the mapping 
between these policies and human capital accumulation. Heckman (2000) 
reviews such studies and argues the case for believing that marginal resources 
have had a significant effect on human capital levels. The key exception, he 
argues, is in the area of pre-school education. Vignoles et al. (2000) provide a 
comprehensive review of evidence on the relationship between inputs and 
outputs for human capital, arguing that the knowledge base is far from complete 
and that widely held views (for example, those relating to the effects of class 
size) do not appear strongly in the empirical evidence assembled by economists. 
There is a plethora of studies that estimate the private return to education 
from micro studies (see Card (1999) for a review). There is a range of estimates 
of the return for different kinds of educational attainment. A ballpark figure of a 
10 per cent return to an extra year of education would constitute a reasonable 
‘consensus’ estimate. However, these returns are private and of no immediate 
significance for policy, unless some market failure is demonstrated that would 
lead to underinvestment. These failures may rest on imperfections in decision-
making — for example, individuals who fail to perceive the return or parents 
who do not value their children’s well-being. They could also rest on failures in 
supporting markets — such as markets for credit and insurance. There is also the 
possibility that other government activity, such as redistributive taxation, 
necessitates an offsetting subsidy. In general, this underpins arguments for 
promoting human capital formation through government action.  
There are plenty of good theoretical reasons to expect social and private 
returns to diverge. It could happen because of some kind of technological 
spillover or the working of the labour market (see, for example, Acemoglu 
(1996)). However, the evidence on social returns to education is very limited. 
The large macro-growth literature that looks at aggregate returns to human 
capital in a cross-country setting yields rather inclusive findings (see the review 
in Krueger and Lindahl (2000)). A number of studies fail to find any significant 
effect of human capital on aggregate output, while others find very large social 
returns — well in excess of the private returns that are characteristic of micro Fiscal Studies 
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data.
13 As argued persuasively by Krueger and Lindahl (2000), this may well be 
due to problems of measurement error and/or reverse causality. Moreover, the 
crude aggregate measures that are utilised make it fairly difficult to know what 
kinds of human capital should be the focus. 
Some recent work has tried to quantify the magnitude of human capital 
externalities in micro data by looking to see how wages are affected by average 
levels of human capital after controlling for individual characteristics. The main 
contributions are by Moretti (2000) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). Moretti 
finds that a 1 per cent increase in the fraction of college graduates in a city raises 
the productivity of other groups of workers by between 1.0 and 2.5 per cent 
depending upon the specification. This is of a similar magnitude to Acemoglu 
and Angrist’s findings, although their effect is not statistically significant.  
V. INTERMEDIATE GOODS TAXATION AND 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
One of the central results of optimal tax theory is the Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) efficiency theorem, which gives a set of conditions under which it is 
optimal not to tax intermediate inputs. Their theory is static and rests on a world 
of perfect competition. Hence, it is not clear how far their analysis should carry 
over to practical situations. However, it is clear that a value added tax is a way of 
achieving the desired outcome. Taxation of income from capital and certain 
kinds of energy taxes are both examples of intermediate goods taxation that we 
observe in practice. Moreover, as we discussed above, there is a literature that 
has argued the case for zero taxation of capital on efficiency grounds. The 
question of whether there are significant aggregate efficiency effects from 
changing tax structure is ultimately an empirical one. 
There is comparatively little research that has explored the growth effects of 
intermediate goods taxation in a dynamic setting. However, an important 
example is the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1994), which considers the 
dynamic consequences of energy taxation. They use a calibrated general 
equilibrium model of the US economy. Their work is important in showing that 
imperfect competition in the energy-using sector can lead to a considerable 
amplification of the aggregate efficiency consequences of energy taxes. In a 
large class of cases, imperfect competition in product markets will lead to tax 
and production cost increases being ‘overshifted’ into prices, i.e. a one unit 
increase in taxation leads to a greater than one unit increase in price. This, in 
turn, implies a larger deadweight loss compared with the perfectly competitive 
scenario. To support the importance of this idea, Besley and Rosen (1999) find 
that there is strong evidence consistent with the imperfect competition story 
                                                                                                                                    
13These high social returns typically come from using the initial level of human capital as a regressor in a 
growth regression. Public Policies and Aggregate Economic Performance 
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using data on goods sold in supermarkets in the USA. Overall, the Rotemberg 
and Woodford results present a sobering message for ongoing discussions about 
the future of energy taxation in the UK. Their results suggest that the aggregate 
output loss is similar to the revenue raised from such taxes for the USA.  
More generally, this type of message suggests that looking at the effect of tax 
policy on aggregate performance may not be confined to those tax policies that 
impinge directly on accumulating factors. Intermediate goods taxation needs also 
to be an important focus. The study of Rotemberg and Woodford also suggests 
that tracing through the effects of imperfect competition creates an important 
link between tax incidence and competition policy, with imperfect competition 
increasing the size of the distortionary effects of taxation. Judd (1997) even 
argues that the optimal tax on capital income should be negative once imperfect 
competition is taken into account. In terms of our overall theme, the presence of 
imperfect competition creates its own wedge between private and social returns 
in the economy and hence may create reasons to change the optimal structure of 
taxes and subsidies. 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The main message of my paper is summarised in Table 1. There are three steps 
to thinking about the link between public policy and growth. First, there is a need 
to consider the factors that promote growth. Second, we need to identify the key 
(behavioural) determinants of these inputs, in terms of how incentives for private 
action are affected by government policy. Third, we need to know what the most 
important divergences are between private and social returns. 
Behavioural evidence is greatest on the effects of policy on labour supply and 
saving. Here, I suggest that there is widespread evidence of compositional effects  
 
TABLE 1 
Policy Effectiveness and Desirability 









Effectiveness      
Taxes Weak  Weak  ?(+)  ?(+) 
Spending  ?(+) ?(+) ?(+) ?(+) 
Desirability      
Social/private returns  Few believe so  ?  +  + 
Conflict (–) or 
complement (+) with 
other objectives 
?(+) +  ?  ? 
Note: ?(+) — not certain, but balance of evidence suggests that it may be positive. Fiscal Studies 
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on saving and possibly on labour supply. However, the evidence for large 
aggregate responses is weak, as is the case for there being externalities that need 
to be fixed. The case where existing evidence is much less clear-cut is the effect 
of policy on technology and human capital formation. These are the areas where 
there is a more widespread view that private and social returns diverge. Yet the 
behavioural studies give a much less good guide. 
This all seems great for research — getting better estimates of social returns 
and of behavioural responses in the key growth sectors. However, it may also 
seem unsatisfactory for the exigencies of policy. Thus the spotlights for policy 
and for research are now shining firmly in the same part of the stage. 
APPENDIX 
DERIVATION OF THE CONDITION IN SECTION II 
To derive the expression on page 361, let t be a generic incentive that can be 
used to encourage or discourage x. Hence, x = h(t). Let the cost to the 
government of having an incentive t be c(h(t),t) and let W(h(t)) be the pay-off 
function that the policy-maker cares about. Then increasing the use of incentive t 
a bit has marginal social benefit 
 
Wh ch c
xt h t t
λ
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  −+  ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
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 ∂∂ ∂ =+  ∂∂ ∂∂  
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, i.e. the elasticity of x with 
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